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Questions	  of	  realism	  take	  on	  a	  rather	  different	  form	  in	  the	  philosophy	  of	  
biology	  from	  their	  more	  traditional	  context	  in	  the	  philosophy	  of	  physics.	  	  
Problems	  arise	  not	  so	  much	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  existence	  of	  the	  entities	  that	  
biologists	  discuss,	  but	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  partial,	  idealized	  or	  abstracted,	  models	  
that	  they	  use	  to	  describe	  them.	  	  Given	  this	  partiality	  of	  representation,	  are	  we	  
entitled	  to	  take	  such	  models	  as	  true	  descriptions	  of	  the	  world?	  There	  is	  a	  
burgeoning	  literature	  on	  models	  in	  the	  life	  sciences,	  some	  of	  which	  will	  be	  
assessed	  in	  this	  chapter.	  	  I	  shall	  argue	  for	  a	  qualified	  realism	  about	  the	  main	  
classes	  of	  such	  models.	  	  However	  it	  is	  important	  to	  recognise	  that	  biological	  
models	  aim	  at	  the	  truth,	  but	  not	  the	  whole	  truth.	  	  This	  is	  why,	  which	  is	  my	  
second	  main	  thesis,	  we	  should	  always	  expect	  multiple	  models	  in	  biology,	  
providing	  partial	  and	  sometimes	  complementary	  perspectives	  on	  the	  reality	  
they	  aim	  to	  illuminate.	  	  This	  pluralistic	  realism	  provides	  a	  framework	  for	  
understanding	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  issues	  in	  the	  philosophy	  of	  biology.	  	  Two	  that	  I	  
shall	  briefly	  discuss	  are	  the	  ineliminable	  role	  of	  context	  in	  understanding	  the	  
nature	  of	  a	  biological	  entity,	  and	  the	  fundamentally	  processual	  nature	  of	  living	  
systems.	  	  This	  chapter	  concludes	  with	  a	  brief	  remark	  on	  the	  relation	  of	  realism	  
to	  the	  wider	  issue	  of	  naturalism.	  
	  
Realism	  and	  Models	  
Realism	  in	  philosophy	  of	  biology	  poses	  a	  quite	  different	  question	  from	  that	  
traditionally	  addressed	  in	  the	  context	  of	  physics.	  The	  question	  whether	  belief	  
in	  quarks,	  neutrinos,	  and	  suchlike	  is	  warranted	  by	  the	  successful	  application	  of	  
theories	  that	  employ	  them	  remains	  a	  contentious	  one.	  	  Bas	  van	  Fraassen	  
(1980)	  is	  one	  prominent	  philosopher	  of	  science	  who	  has	  continued	  to	  argue	  
that	  belief	  in	  unobservable	  entities	  is	  unwarranted.	  This	  does,	  however	  raise	  a	  
very	  tricky	  problem	  of	  deciding	  exactly	  what	  constitutes	  the	  observation	  of	  an	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entity,	  and	  probably	  more	  philosophers	  now	  would	  take	  a	  demarcation	  
between	  the	  unproblematically	  real	  and	  the	  philosophically	  debatable	  as	  
suggested	  by	  Ian	  Hacking’s	  famous	  remark,	  ‘If	  you	  spray	  electrons,	  then	  they	  
are	  real’	  (Hacking	  1983,	  p.	  24).	  	  If	  we	  can	  do	  things	  with,	  or	  to,	  an	  entity,	  then	  
we	  are	  entitled	  to	  believe	  it	  exists.	  
	  
From	  this	  point	  of	  view	  there	  should	  be	  no	  serious	  debate	  about	  the	  reality	  of	  
nucleic	  acids,	  amino	  acids,	  and	  so	  on.	  	  It	  is	  not	  that	  they	  are	  ‘directly’	  
observable:	  though	  we	  can	  observe	  these	  large	  molecules	  in	  one	  sense	  
through	  high-­‐powered	  microscopes,	  we	  cannot	  observe	  that	  they	  are	  nucleic	  
acids	  or	  polypeptides	  any	  more	  that	  we	  can	  ‘directly’	  observe	  that	  a	  track	  in	  a	  
cloud	  chamber	  is	  an	  electron.	  But	  we	  can	  do	  lots	  of	  things	  with	  DNA	  
molecules.	  Just	  as	  one	  example,	  transplantation	  of	  alien	  genes	  into	  organisms	  
is	  often	  ineffective	  because	  the	  host	  organism	  preferentially	  uses	  different	  
versions	  of	  synonymous	  codons.	  	  To	  address	  this,	  scientists	  can	  rewrite	  the	  
transplanted	  DNA	  using	  the	  preferred	  codons,	  and	  this	  often	  enables	  the	  
transplanted	  gene	  to	  be	  expressed	  	  (Gustaffson	  et	  al.	  2004	  ).	  	  If	  you	  can	  
rewrite	  it,	  it	  is	  real.	  	  
	  
Interesting	  questions	  of	  realism	  arise	  in	  biology	  not	  about	  the	  existence	  of	  
entities	  but	  about	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  representations	  of	  biological	  entities,	  or	  
biological	  models,	  correspond	  to	  the	  world.	  	  There	  is	  a	  parallel	  here	  with	  a	  
somewhat	  different	  traditional	  question,	  whether	  the	  laws	  or	  theories	  
postulated	  by	  science	  are	  true,	  a	  negative	  answer	  to	  which	  question	  is	  often	  
motivated	  by	  the	  so-­‐called	  pessimistic	  induction	  on	  the	  history	  of	  science,	  the	  
claim	  that	  all	  past	  theories	  have	  turned	  out	  to	  be	  false,	  so	  ours	  probably	  will	  
too.	  	  The	  problem	  does	  not	  arise	  in	  quite	  this	  form	  for	  biology,	  because	  most	  
philosophers	  of	  biology	  are	  sceptical	  of	  whether	  there	  are	  any	  laws	  or	  theories	  
in	  biology,	  and	  have	  described	  biological	  ideas	  in	  terms	  of	  models	  that	  are	  
held	  to	  represent	  their	  target	  phenomena.	  	  Whereas	  laws	  have	  traditionally	  
been	  taken	  to	  be	  quite	  literally	  true	  (or	  false),	  the	  relation	  between	  models	  
and	  their	  intended	  targets	  is	  at	  least	  more	  complex.	  
	  
In	  what	  follows	  I	  shall	  refer	  freely	  to	  biological	  models.	  	  However	  I	  need	  to	  
acknowledge	  that	  my	  use	  of	  the	  term	  is	  somewhat	  cavalier	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  
extensive	  and	  often	  subtle	  discussion	  of	  this	  topic	  in	  recent	  philosophy.	  	  
Michael	  Weisberg	  (2007)	  distinguishes	  scientific	  modelling	  from	  ‘abstract	  
direct	  representation’	  (ADR).	  The	  former	  involves	  exploration	  of	  a	  structure	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that	  is	  in	  some	  way	  analogous	  to	  the	  system	  it	  is	  supposed	  to	  illuminate,	  but	  
the	  elements	  of	  which	  do	  not	  claim	  to	  represent	  anything	  in	  reality.	  	  Many	  
models	  in	  evolutionary	  theory	  or	  population	  ecology	  are	  of	  this	  kind.	  
	  
Somewhat	  similarly,	  Tarja	  Knuuttila	  (2005),	  focusing	  especially	  on	  economic	  
models,	  holds	  that	  scientific	  models	  are	  best	  seen	  as	  cognitive	  tools,	  designed	  
to	  explore	  a	  structure	  taken	  to	  be	  similar	  in	  some	  respects	  to	  a	  target	  system	  
in	  the	  world,	  but	  by	  analogy	  rather	  than	  any	  direct	  correspondence.	  	  Abstract	  
direct	  representation,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  involves	  representation	  of	  specific	  
entities	  that	  are	  supposed	  to	  exist,	  but	  which	  are	  described	  in	  ways	  that	  
abstract	  from	  some	  of	  their	  features	  that	  are	  taken	  to	  be	  unimportant	  given	  
the	  purposes	  for	  which	  the	  representations	  are	  to	  be	  used.	  In	  fact,	  according	  
to	  Weisberg,	  “theorists	  who	  practice	  ADR	  typically	  aim	  to	  give	  complete	  
representations”	  (2007,	  229),	  though	  they	  never	  fully	  achieve	  this	  goal.	  	  I	  am	  
slightly	  sceptical	  of	  this	  distinction,	  at	  least	  in	  that	  I	  suspect	  that	  many	  cases	  
may	  be	  difficult	  to	  allocate	  unequivocally	  to	  one	  category	  or	  another.	  	  But	  
given	  that	  my	  present	  topic	  is	  realism,	  my	  interest	  is	  in	  ADR,	  or	  in	  strategies	  
well	  to	  that	  end	  of	  the	  spectrum,	  rather	  than	  what	  Weisberg	  refers	  to	  as	  
models	  strictu	  sensu.	  As	  will	  become,	  I	  am	  also	  sceptical	  about	  the	  goal	  of	  
complete	  representation,	  which	  may	  contribute	  to	  this	  partial	  disagreement	  
with	  Weisberg.	  
	  
Biological	  models	  in	  my	  broad	  sense	  are,	  at	  any	  rate,	  a	  motley	  crew.	  Some	  
biological	  models	  are	  concrete	  entities,	  like	  the	  highly	  standardised	  model	  
organisms	  that	  are	  taken	  to	  represent,	  more	  or	  less,	  much	  wider	  classes	  of	  
organisms	  (Leonelli	  and	  Ankeny	  2013),	  or	  the	  sticks	  and	  balls	  arranged	  to	  form	  
representations	  of	  molecular	  structures.	  	  Others	  are	  sets	  of	  equations,	  used	  to	  
represent	  phenomena	  as	  diverse	  as	  the	  relations	  of	  population	  numbers	  in	  
ecological	  systems	  or	  the	  concentrations	  of	  chemical	  species	  in	  metabolic	  
processes.	  Systems	  biologists	  try,	  sometimes,	  to	  integrate	  such	  mathematical	  
representations	  into	  models	  of	  much	  wider	  biological	  systems.	  	  Structural	  
models	  may	  be	  used	  to	  explore,	  perhaps	  using	  computer	  technologies,	  
interactions	  between	  biological	  molecules.	  And	  so	  on.	  	  The	  models	  that	  will	  be	  
my	  concern	  here	  will	  be	  biological	  models	  that	  it	  is	  at	  least	  strongly	  tempting	  
to	  interpret	  realistically,	  for	  example	  structural	  models	  of	  molecules,	  
metabolic	  pathways,	  or	  cells.	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What	  is	  common	  to	  all	  these	  kinds	  of	  models	  is	  that,	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  
dominant	  traditional	  interpretations	  of	  scientific	  laws1,	  they	  are	  not	  expected	  
or	  intended	  to	  be	  strictly	  true.	  	  Just	  as	  a	  map	  will	  emphasise	  particular	  
features	  of	  the	  environment	  and	  ignore	  others,	  on	  pain	  of	  the	  fate	  
immortalised	  in	  Borges’s	  story	  of	  the	  perfect,	  and	  thus	  completely	  useless,	  
map	  (Borges	  1973),	  models	  focus	  on	  particular	  features	  of	  the	  phenomenon	  
they	  aim	  to	  represent,	  and	  ignore	  others.	  This	  suggests	  a	  simple	  answer	  to	  the	  
question	  whether	  a	  model	  is	  true:	  if	  the	  features	  it	  aims	  to	  represent	  
correspond	  exactly	  with	  the	  features	  in	  the	  system	  or	  entity	  represented,	  then	  
the	  model	  should	  count	  as	  true.	  	  Unfortunately,	  models	  do	  not	  typically	  come	  
with	  a	  definitive	  statement	  of	  their	  intended	  application,	  so	  this	  criterion	  is	  
not	  readily	  applicable.	  	  Indeed,	  models	  are	  often	  used	  to	  explore	  phenomena	  
by	  determining	  empirically	  the	  limits	  of	  their	  application,	  a	  project	  that	  would	  
be	  rendered	  unintelligible	  if	  the	  intended	  scope	  of	  application	  were	  given	  in	  
advance.	  	  	  
	  
If	  science,	  or	  at	  any	  rate	  biology,	  does	  indeed	  provide	  us	  only	  with	  partial	  and	  
abstracted	  models	  of	  phenomena,	  are	  we	  entitled	  to	  claim	  that	  they	  are	  
realistic?	  As	  noted	  above,	  some	  models	  are	  not	  intended	  to	  be	  realistic.	  	  A	  
paradigm	  area	  of	  science	  in	  which	  this	  is	  plausible	  is	  neoclassical	  economics	  
(Knuuttila	  2005).	  But	  there	  is	  an	  obvious	  and	  revealing	  contrast	  between	  
economics	  and	  models	  in	  a	  field	  such	  as	  molecular	  biology.	  	  No	  one	  doubts	  
that	  there	  are	  real	  economic	  agents,	  and	  no	  one	  supposes	  that	  there	  are	  
perfectly	  rational	  agents.	  	  The	  object	  of	  models	  involving	  the	  latter	  is	  not	  to	  
identify	  what	  kinds	  of	  entities	  or	  processes	  there	  are	  in	  the	  world,	  but	  to	  
propose	  a	  concept	  in	  terms	  of	  which	  the	  aggregation	  of	  the	  behaviours	  of	  real	  
agents	  may	  be	  better	  understood.	  	  Whether	  the	  model	  is	  successful	  depends	  
on	  whether	  typically,	  or	  in	  aggregate,	  the	  behaviour	  of	  real	  agents	  
approximates	  to	  that	  of	  the	  ideal	  agents	  in	  the	  model.	  	  If	  it	  does,	  then	  the	  
model	  may	  be	  a	  useful	  device	  for	  predicting	  or	  explaining	  economic	  outcomes	  
in	  the	  real	  world.	  But	  it	  does	  not	  seem	  that	  there	  is	  any	  point	  at	  which	  such	  a	  
model	  is	  intended	  to	  correspond	  to	  the	  world.	  	  
	  
Compare	  a	  model	  of,	  say,	  the	  citric	  acid	  or	  Krebs	  cycle,	  a	  set	  of	  chemical	  
reactions	  central	  to	  metabolism	  for	  all	  aerobic	  organisms.	  	  We	  do	  not	  start	  
here	  with	  an	  uncontested	  entity	  that	  we	  want	  to	  understand	  better,	  but	  
rather	  we	  postulate	  a	  process	  involving	  a	  set	  of	  (real)	  entities	  whose	  
interactions	  may	  help	  to	  explain	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  empirical	  phenomena.	  	  Either	  
 5 
before	  or	  after	  formulating	  the	  model	  we	  will	  hope	  to	  confirm	  that	  these	  
entities	  do	  in	  fact	  occur	  in	  the	  cells	  to	  which	  the	  model	  is	  intended	  to	  apply.	  	  
We	  then	  may	  confirm,	  most	  likely	  in	  vitro,	  that	  they	  react	  together	  in	  the	  
required	  ways.	  	  Gradually	  we	  gain	  increasing	  confidence	  that	  we	  have	  
identified	  something	  that	  really	  happens	  in	  living	  systems.	  	  The	  purpose	  of	  the	  
model	  is	  to	  represent.	  	  To	  believe	  that	  it	  succeeds	  is	  to	  interpret	  it	  realistically.	  	  
It	  is	  necessary	  to	  bear	  in	  mind,	  however,	  that	  a	  realistic	  interpretation	  of	  the	  
Krebs	  cycle	  model	  doesn’t	  require	  that	  something	  identical	  to	  the	  reactions	  
occurring	  in	  a	  test	  tube	  happens	  in	  the	  living	  cell,	  nor	  that	  the	  descriptions	  of	  
entities	  in	  the	  model	  are	  complete	  descriptions	  of	  the	  entities	  in	  the	  world.	  	  In	  
vivo,	  this	  metabolic	  process	  is	  interconnected	  with	  multiple	  other	  processes	  
that	  provide	  the	  metabolites	  and	  employ	  the	  products	  of	  these	  particular	  
reactions.	  	  	  The	  rate	  of	  the	  reactions	  isolated	  in	  this	  particular	  cycle	  will	  
depend	  on	  these	  contextual	  processes	  as	  will,	  thereby,	  its	  impact	  on	  the	  larger	  
systems	  within	  which	  it	  is	  embedded.	  	  The	  model	  aims	  to	  represent	  a	  part	  or	  
an	  aspect	  of	  what	  happens,	  but	  not	  to	  correspond	  exactly	  with	  anything	  real.	  	  
	  
Pluralism	  	  
This	  incompleteness	  of	  models	  leads	  me	  to	  my	  first	  main	  thesis:	  we	  should	  
welcome	  and	  expect	  a	  plurality	  of	  models	  of	  biological	  phenomena.	  	  If	  we	  
imagine	  that	  science	  gives	  us	  the	  whole	  truth,	  we	  are	  likely	  to	  suppose	  that	  
the	  ultimate	  objective	  is	  a	  single	  model	  that	  represents	  everything	  about	  a	  
phenomenon	  of	  interest,	  as	  the	  classical	  picture	  described	  in	  Chapter	  1.2	  
suggests.	  	  	  But	  once	  we	  see	  that	  models	  abstract	  particular	  features	  of	  interest	  
or	  of	  relevance	  to	  particular	  questions	  from	  the	  complexity	  of	  natural	  
(especially	  living)	  systems,	  this	  ideal	  of	  completeness	  can	  be	  seen	  to	  be	  quite	  
misguided.	  	  Different	  interests	  will	  call	  for	  different	  models;	  and	  for	  
phenomena	  of	  high	  complexity	  multiple	  models	  will	  be	  desirable	  regardless	  of	  
any	  specific	  questions	  or	  interests2.	  	  	  
	  
Let	  me	  illustrate	  the	  pluralism	  I	  have	  in	  mind	  with	  the	  example	  of	  the	  genome.	  	  
Nobody	  now	  doubts	  that	  genomes	  exist,	  though	  at	  an	  earlier	  stage	  of	  enquiry	  
successful	  models	  of	  the	  genome	  were	  instrumental	  in	  their	  movement	  form	  
hypothetical	  entities	  to	  unquestioned	  existents.	  	  Indeed,	  the	  possibility	  of	  
providing	  multiple	  consistent	  though	  independent	  models	  of	  the	  genome	  are	  
now	  a	  central	  part	  of	  what	  puts	  their	  existence	  beyond	  question	  (Barwich	  
2013).	  	  Consider,	  then	  some	  of	  the	  models	  of	  genomes	  commonly	  employed.	  	  
Most	  familiar	  are	  the	  sequences	  of	  four	  letters,	  representing	  the	  nucleotides	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Adenine,	  Cytosine,	  Guanine,	  and	  Thymine.	  	  These	  sequences,	  we	  suppose	  with	  
good	  empirical	  reason,	  often	  correctly	  represent	  the	  order	  in	  which	  the	  
nucleotides	  appear	  in	  a	  real	  molecule.	  	  If	  they	  do	  this,	  then	  what	  they	  say	  is	  
true.	  	  The	  representation	  serves	  to	  predict	  or	  explain,	  among	  other	  things,	  the	  
subsequent	  formation	  of	  strands	  of	  RNA	  and	  of	  polypeptides,	  with	  specific	  
sequences	  of	  molecular	  constituents	  related	  to	  that	  of	  the	  DNA.	  
	  
A	  quite	  different	  representation	  of	  the	  genome	  presents	  the	  general	  structure	  
of	  the	  DNA	  polymer	  and	  its	  double	  helical	  structure,	  displaying	  the	  various	  
chemical	  bonds	  that	  hold	  the	  structure	  together,	  including	  for	  instancethe	  
weak	  bonds	  between	  base	  pairs	  that	  are	  broken	  when	  the	  two	  strands	  
separate.	  	  Such	  a	  model,	  often	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  concrete	  three-­‐dimensional	  
model,	  is	  typically	  used	  to	  instruct	  students	  about	  the	  structure	  and	  function	  
of	  the	  DNA	  molecule.	  It	  would	  be	  possible	  simultaneously	  to	  represent	  this	  
molecular	  structure	  and	  a	  specific	  sequence	  though,	  given	  the	  different	  
functions	  that	  these	  models	  serve,	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  imagine	  any	  occasion	  for	  doing	  
so.	  
	  
The	  above	  three-­‐dimensional	  structure	  of	  the	  DNA	  even	  if,	  for	  whatever	  
strange	  reason,	  extended	  to	  billions	  of	  base	  pairs	  length	  with	  a	  sequence	  of	  
nucleotides	  mapping	  some	  actual	  genome	  (or	  better	  now,	  chromosome,	  since	  
most	  genomes	  contain	  a	  number	  of	  these	  subunits),	  is	  still	  far	  from	  a	  
complete	  representation	  of	  the	  genome	  (or	  even	  single	  chromosome).	  	  Actual	  
genomes	  contain	  much	  more	  than	  DNA.	  	  First	  we	  should	  include	  the	  histones,	  
proteins	  that	  form	  the	  structural	  core	  of	  the	  chromosome,	  and	  around	  which	  
they	  are	  densely	  spooled,	  as	  is	  required	  to	  enable	  2	  metres	  of	  DNA	  (in	  the	  
human	  case)	  to	  fit	  into	  a	  few	  tens	  of	  micrometres	  of	  cell	  diameter.	  	  Second,	  
many	  molecules	  are,	  at	  any	  time,	  attached	  to	  the	  genome	  in	  ways	  that	  
crucially	  determine	  its	  behaviour.	  	  Various	  of	  these	  bond	  to	  particular	  parts	  of	  
the	  genome	  inhibiting	  or	  enhancing	  the	  expression	  of	  particular	  sequences.	  	  
Of	  special	  interest	  are	  the	  small	  molecules	  that	  modify	  either	  the	  nucleotides	  
themselves,	  or	  the	  histone	  core,	  in	  the	  various	  processes	  generally	  referred	  to	  
as	  epigenetics.	  	  These	  modifications	  change	  the	  chemical	  composition	  and	  
shape	  of	  the	  chromosome	  and,	  by	  thereby	  exposing	  or	  restricting	  access	  of	  
particular	  sequences	  to	  the	  transcription	  machinery,	  help	  to	  determine	  the	  
functioning	  of	  the	  genome.	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This	  last	  point	  draws	  attention	  to	  a	  very	  fundamental	  issue:	  the	  genome	  is	  not	  
a	  static	  object,	  but	  highly	  dynamic.	  	  Its	  shape	  and	  its	  behaviour	  are	  constantly	  
changing.	  	  All	  of	  the	  representations	  I	  have	  just	  sketched,	  as	  indeed	  any	  model	  
that	  represents	  a	  structural	  feature	  of	  the	  genome,	  are	  in	  fact	  of	  snapshots,	  
frozen	  in	  time,	  of	  an	  instant	  of	  this	  genomic	  process.	  	  To	  imagine	  a	  ‘complete’	  
model	  of	  the	  genome	  it	  would	  not	  be	  sufficient	  to	  somehow	  integrate	  all	  of	  
these	  various	  perspectives	  in	  three	  dimensions,	  but	  one	  would	  need	  also	  to	  
extend	  the	  representation	  in	  time	  and	  present	  the	  dynamics	  of	  the	  system.	  	  
Some	  of	  these	  dynamic	  elements	  form	  parts	  of	  the	  typical	  development	  of	  the	  
wider	  cell	  or	  organism,	  others	  reflect	  adaptive	  responses	  to	  contingent	  
features	  of	  the	  wider	  environment.	  	  Both	  these	  dynamic	  aspects	  are	  vital	  parts	  
of	  the	  function	  of	  the	  whole.	  	  I	  shall	  return	  to	  this	  question	  of	  living	  dynamics	  
below.	  
	  
One	  reason	  it	  is	  important	  to	  be	  clear	  on	  these	  issues	  is	  that	  it	  is	  very	  common	  
to	  take	  a	  partial	  representation	  as	  the	  whole	  truth,	  or	  at	  least	  the	  sufficient	  
truth,	  about	  some	  object	  of	  enquiry.	  	  A	  striking	  example	  of	  the	  problems	  this	  
can	  cause	  was	  the	  genetic	  determinism	  widely	  propagated	  in	  the	  course	  of	  
the	  human	  genome	  project.	  	  It	  is	  possible	  that	  some	  of	  the	  notorious	  
statements	  by	  prominent	  scientists3,	  describing	  the	  human	  genome	  as	  the	  
book	  of	  life,	  or	  the	  blueprint	  for	  the	  human,	  were	  best	  understood	  as	  
propaganda	  for	  funding	  of	  the	  project.	  	  However,	  these	  ideas	  have	  certainly	  
disseminated	  into	  public	  understanding	  so	  that	  sequences	  of	  As,	  Cs,	  Gs	  and	  Ts	  
have	  achieved	  an	  almost	  sacred	  status,	  one	  visible,	  for	  instance,	  in	  certain	  
arguments	  to	  block	  the	  development	  of	  genetically	  modified	  foods4.	  	  Even	  if	  
by	  ‘genome’	  in	  these	  contexts	  were	  meant	  the	  full,	  four-­‐dimensional,	  concrete	  
entity,	  including	  all	  the	  aspects	  discussed	  above,	  these	  statements	  would	  be	  
hyperbolic.	  	  The	  genome	  is	  a	  fundamentally	  important	  element	  of	  all	  known	  
biological	  systems,	  but	  it	  is	  still	  only	  one	  of	  many	  without	  which	  these	  systems	  
could	  not	  be	  properly	  understood.	  	  To	  reduce	  the	  organism	  merely	  to	  the	  
sequence	  of	  nucleotides	  in	  the	  genome,	  however,	  is	  wholly	  absurd.	  	  	  
	  
It	  is,	  incidentally,	  easy	  to	  see	  the	  attraction	  of	  the	  fetishization	  of	  genome	  
sequence,	  as	  it	  provides	  an	  acceptable	  way	  to	  short	  circuit	  the	  problem	  of	  
development,	  and	  the	  reproduction	  of	  biological	  form.	  The	  question	  how	  
organisms	  develop	  to	  become	  as	  similar	  as	  they	  do	  to	  their	  parents	  is	  as	  
fundamental	  and	  difficult	  as	  any	  in	  biology,	  and	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  explanation	  
was	  there	  from	  the	  start,	  whether,	  as	  in	  ancient	  visions	  of	  an	  animalcule	  in	  the	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head	  of	  a	  sperm,	  or	  as	  information	  ‘encoded’	  in	  the	  genome,	  is	  perennially	  
appealing.	  This	  attraction	  is	  obvious	  in	  Richard	  Dawkins’s	  (1976)	  appealing	  but	  
misguided	  reduction	  of	  evolution	  to	  genetics:	  if	  the	  development	  of	  the	  
organism	  could	  be	  fully	  encapsulated	  in	  genome	  sequence,	  it	  could	  be	  ignored	  
from	  the	  perspective	  of	  genetic	  models	  of	  evolution.	  	  Unfortunately	  life	  is	  not	  
that	  simple.	  	  
	  
The	  moral	  of	  all	  this	  for	  present	  purposes	  is	  the	  necessity	  of	  cautious	  realism.	  	  
It	  is	  always	  important	  to	  remember	  that	  scientific	  models	  present	  only	  partial	  
truths	  and	  abstract	  from	  a	  great	  deal	  that	  is	  important.	  	  But	  it	  would	  be	  as	  
absurd	  to	  deny	  that	  genome	  sequence	  corresponds	  to	  some	  aspect	  of	  reality	  
as	  it	  would	  be	  to	  suppose	  that	  it	  provided	  the	  whole	  truth	  about	  any	  real	  
entity.	  	  Once	  this	  simple	  point	  is	  recognised	  it	  becomes	  almost	  inevitable	  that	  
we	  will	  want	  multiple	  models	  of	  a	  real	  entity,	  models	  that	  address	  some	  of	  the	  
aspects	  ignored	  by	  a	  single	  model.	  	  Just	  the	  same	  argument	  could	  be	  directed	  
at	  the	  stereochemical	  and	  epigenetic	  models	  of	  the	  genome	  mentioned	  
above.	  	  These	  models	  reflect	  an	  aspect	  of	  reality,	  but	  only	  an	  aspect.	  Thus	  it	  is	  
not	  only	  possible	  to	  be	  both	  a	  pluralist	  and	  a	  realist	  about	  scientific	  models,	  
but	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  we	  should	  be	  both.	  	  	  
	  
It	  is	  worth	  mentioning	  in	  passing	  that	  I	  believe	  that	  just	  the	  same	  applies	  to	  
so-­‐called	  fundamental	  physics.	  	  Theoretical	  articulations	  of	  reductionism	  
generally	  start	  with	  the	  premise	  that	  physics	  provides	  models	  that	  apply	  to	  
absolutely	  everything,	  so	  that	  ultimately	  we	  should	  be	  able	  to	  understand	  
absolutely	  everything	  by	  appeal	  only	  to	  these	  models	  (or	  perhaps	  rather	  by	  
some	  set	  of	  laws).	  	  Physicalism,	  the	  widely	  held	  view	  that	  there	  is	  nothing	  
wholly	  non-­‐physical,	  does	  imply	  that	  there	  are	  aspects	  of	  everything	  that	  are	  
physical.	  	  Organisms	  obey	  the	  law	  of	  gravity,	  for	  instance.	  	  But	  that	  the	  
physiological,	  ecological,	  etc.	  properties	  of	  organisms	  also	  fall	  within	  the	  
purview	  of	  physical	  laws	  or	  models	  seems	  to	  me	  a	  view	  that	  reveals	  a	  deep	  
misunderstanding	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  scientific	  representation,	  and	  certainly	  
should	  not	  be	  implied	  by	  a	  reasonable	  physicalism.	  The	  extrapolation	  from	  
models	  developed	  to	  understand	  the	  behaviour	  of	  the	  simple	  microphysical	  
systems	  constructed	  in	  laboratories,	  or	  of	  physical	  aspects	  of	  gross	  mechanical	  
or	  chemical	  systems	  as	  found,	  for	  example,	  in	  astronomy,	  to	  everything	  
whatever,	  is	  as	  lacking	  in	  justification	  as	  the	  extrapolation	  I	  have	  just	  
considered	  in	  genomics.	  	  This,	  unfortunately,	  is	  an	  issue	  detailed	  discussion	  of	  
which	  is	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  our	  book	  (but	  see	  Dupré	  1993;	  Butterfield	  2011).	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I	  have	  explained	  why	  actual	  models	  used	  in	  molecular	  biology	  are	  partial	  and	  
abstract	  from	  the	  complexities	  of	  the	  real	  world.	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand	  such	  
models	  should	  presumably	  not	  be	  inconsistent	  with	  one	  another,	  and	  if	  not	  
there	  seems	  no	  reason	  why	  we	  should	  not	  aspire	  to	  produce	  some	  summation	  
of	  partial	  models	  that	  ultimately	  acquires	  the	  status	  of	  a	  complete	  model.	  I	  do	  
not	  claim	  that	  there	  is	  a	  logical	  impossibility	  to	  some	  four	  dimensional	  
representation	  of	  every	  structural	  feature	  of	  some	  genome,	  extended	  through	  
time	  to	  represent	  the	  dynamic	  functionality	  of	  the	  whole	  system.	  	  Such	  things	  
have	  sometimes	  been	  supposed	  to	  exist	  in	  the	  mind	  of	  God.	  	  But	  even	  should	  
there	  turn	  out	  to	  be	  such	  a	  thing,	  it	  is	  not	  the	  goal	  of	  science	  to	  explore	  the	  
mind	  of	  God.	  	  More	  seriously,	  even	  such	  a	  four	  dimensional	  model	  would	  only	  
represent	  the	  history	  of	  one	  particular	  genome	  subject	  to	  a	  very	  likely	  unique	  
set	  of	  causal	  influences.	  	  There	  is	  no	  reason	  to	  think	  it	  would	  have	  any	  general	  
utility.	  	  At	  any	  rate,	  such	  supposedly	  complete	  representations	  play	  no	  part	  in	  
the	  actual	  business	  of	  doing	  real	  science.	  	  Yet	  this	  is	  no	  reason	  to	  deny	  that	  
actual,	  partial	  scientific	  models	  may	  correspond	  to	  reality	  in	  the	  specific	  ways	  
that	  they	  are	  intended	  to	  do	  so.	  	  
	  
Context	  and	  Process	  	  
In	  fact,	  as	  just	  noted,	  even	  the	  complete	  model	  imagined	  in	  the	  previous	  
paragraph	  would	  not	  provide	  the	  kind	  of	  universal	  predictive	  and	  explanatory	  
import	  sometimes	  imagined	  by	  advocates	  of	  a	  complete	  and	  final	  science.	  	  I	  
want	  now	  to	  discuss	  two	  reasons	  for	  this.	  	  First	  is	  the	  question	  of	  context.	  	  
Even	  a	  complete	  model	  of	  the	  genome	  in	  the	  sense	  just	  discussed	  would	  not	  
be	  a	  sufficient	  description	  for	  all	  scientific	  purposes	  without	  some	  
specification	  of	  context;	  context	  partially	  determines	  the	  properties	  of	  a	  
biological	  entity.	  	  Second,	  and	  closely	  connected	  to	  the	  first	  point,	  I	  want	  to	  
re-­‐emphasize	  the	  importance	  of	  process.	  	  I	  have	  already	  noted	  that	  a	  full	  
description	  of	  an	  entity	  such	  as	  a	  genome	  must	  be	  four-­‐dimensional,	  extended	  
through	  time.	  	  But	  a	  living	  process	  is	  not	  a	  self-­‐contained	  thing,	  with	  its	  
trajectory	  determined	  by	  its	  internal	  structure.	  	  Its	  persistence	  is	  determined	  
in	  part	  by	  its	  interaction	  with	  its	  environment.	  The	  fact	  that	  models	  of	  
biological	  structure	  abstract	  from	  the	  dynamic	  features	  of	  the	  entity	  
represented	  reinforces	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  character	  of	  the	  entity	  is	  
dependent	  on	  its	  wider	  context.	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Even	  if	  a	  model	  were	  able	  to	  represent	  everything	  within	  its	  intended	  domain,	  
it	  must	  stop	  somewhere.	  	  So,	  for	  example,	  even	  a	  ‘complete’	  model	  of	  a	  cell	  
would	  not	  include	  a	  full	  description	  of	  the	  surrounding	  biological	  or	  physical	  
conditions.	  	  But	  a	  cell,	  or	  for	  that	  matter	  an	  organism,	  is	  an	  open	  system	  
maintained	  in	  thermodynamic	  disequilibrium	  by	  its	  interactions	  with	  the	  
environment.	  	  So	  a	  representation	  of	  such	  an	  entity	  is	  inevitably	  inadequate	  to	  
a	  full	  understanding	  of	  its	  behaviour.	  	  This	  simple	  point	  is	  already	  sufficient	  to	  
show	  that	  biological	  representation	  is	  only	  partial.	  	  However,	  there	  is	  a	  deeper	  
point:	  the	  external	  context	  in	  which	  a	  biological	  entity	  is	  positioned	  does	  not	  
only	  partially	  determine	  its	  behaviour	  through	  interaction	  between	  entity	  and	  
context,	  it	  may	  contribute	  to	  determining	  what	  the	  entity	  is.	  	  Or	  so	  I	  argue.	  
	  
Consider	  protein-­‐coding	  genes.	  	  One	  quite	  legitimate	  representation	  of	  such	  a	  
gene	  is	  in	  terms	  of	  sequence.	  	  But	  genes	  are	  also	  identified	  in	  terms	  of	  
function.	  In	  their	  origins	  in	  Mendelian	  genetics,	  genes	  were	  identified	  in	  terms	  
of	  the	  difference	  they	  made	  to	  a	  phenotype—the	  genes	  for	  eye	  colour	  or	  
bristle	  number,	  for	  instance,	  studied	  in	  classic	  research	  on	  Drosophila	  by	  
Thomas	  Hunt	  Morgan	  and	  his	  associates.	  	  A	  particular	  sequence	  is	  capable	  of	  
determining	  whether	  a	  fly	  has	  a	  particular	  eye	  colour,	  but	  only	  given	  a	  wide	  
range	  of	  background	  conditions	  in	  the	  cells	  of	  the	  fly.	  	  In	  fact	  the	  same	  
sequence	  could	  occur	  in	  a	  quite	  different	  organism,	  with	  quite	  different	  
effects	  on	  the	  organism	  phenotype.	  	  	  
	  
Identifying	  genes	  as	  being	  “for”	  phenotypic	  features,	  is	  in	  many	  ways	  
problematic,	  as	  has	  been	  extensively	  pointed	  out	  by	  philosophers	  of	  biology	  
(see,	  e.g.,	  Dupré	  2012,	  pp.	  105ff;	  Griffiths	  and	  Stotz).	  	  But	  the	  same	  problem	  
arises	  for	  more	  proximate	  functions.	  	  It	  is	  natural	  to	  think	  of	  a	  “protein-­‐
coding”	  gene	  as	  coding	  for	  a	  particular	  protein.	  	  But	  it	  is	  now	  well	  known	  that	  
a	  gene	  may	  code	  for	  many,	  sometimes	  even	  thousands	  of,	  different	  proteins	  
as	  RNA	  transcripts	  are	  rearranged	  in	  the	  process	  of	  splicing,	  or	  subject	  to	  
various	  kinds	  of	  post-­‐transcriptional	  editing.	  	  So	  again,	  a	  description	  of	  a	  gene	  
in	  terms	  of	  the	  protein	  it	  codes	  for	  is	  underdetermined	  by	  genetic	  sequence,	  
and	  is	  made	  true,	  in	  part,	  by	  further	  conditions	  of	  the	  cellular	  environment.	  	  	  
	  
Even	  the	  protein	  does	  not	  provide	  a	  stopping	  place	  for	  this	  contextual	  
determination	  of	  functional	  descriptions.	  	  It	  is	  increasingly	  clear	  that	  proteins	  
can	  display	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  different	  functions	  depending	  on	  their	  location	  
within	  the	  cellular	  milieu	  (Jeffery	  1999).	  	  It	  is	  fascinating	  that	  this	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phenomenon	  is	  widely	  labelled	  as	  protein	  “moonlighting”,	  suggesting	  that	  the	  
protein	  has	  a	  proper	  function,	  and	  is	  doing	  something	  different	  in	  its	  spare	  
time,	  an	  implication	  that	  surely	  reflects	  a	  residual	  assumption	  that	  a	  biological	  
entity	  has	  at	  least	  a	  primary	  function	  determined	  by	  it	  structure.	  	  But	  of	  
course,	  though	  one	  function	  may	  be	  primary	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  it	  occurred	  
earlier	  in	  evolutionary	  history,	  this	  has	  no	  relevance	  to	  a	  current	  
understanding	  of	  the	  way	  a	  system	  works.	  	  So	  the	  question	  whether,	  for	  
example,	  some	  entity	  is	  a	  structural	  protein	  or	  an	  enzyme,	  will	  often	  depend	  
on	  the	  broader	  context	  in	  which	  it	  is	  located.	  
	  
The	  upshot	  of	  these	  examples	  is	  that	  no	  spatially	  restricted	  description	  of	  a	  
biological	  entity	  is	  sufficient	  for	  a	  full	  understanding	  of	  what	  it	  is,	  still	  less	  of	  its	  
behaviour.	  	  There	  are	  no	  closed	  biological	  systems,	  and	  their	  openness	  
involves	  ways	  in	  which	  their	  behaviour	  is	  partially	  determined	  by	  their	  
context.	  	  This	  issue	  has	  an	  important	  bearing	  on	  discussions	  of	  reductionism.	  	  
The	  suggestion	  that	  the	  behaviour	  of	  a	  biological	  system	  could	  be	  explained	  or	  
predicted	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  molecular	  parts	  is	  clearly	  vulnerable	  to	  the	  kind	  of	  
problem	  just	  presented.	  	  Reductionists	  are	  liable	  to	  respond	  that	  we	  have	  just	  
assumed	  too	  narrow	  a	  scope	  for	  the	  reductive	  base,	  and	  a	  successful	  
reduction	  will	  require	  inclusion	  of	  the	  relevant	  aspects	  of	  the	  context.	  	  But	  of	  
course	  the	  same	  problem	  is	  sure	  to	  arise	  for	  the	  elements	  of	  the	  context	  that	  
are	  then	  included,	  and	  there	  is	  no	  reason	  why	  this	  process	  should	  terminate.	  	  	  
	  
Given	  the	  increasing	  implausibility	  of	  practical	  reduction	  as	  the	  posited	  
reducing	  base	  expands	  in	  this	  way,	  at	  this	  point	  the	  reductionist	  will	  usually	  
retreat	  to	  supervenience,	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  behaviour	  of	  the	  whole	  is	  
determined	  by	  a	  sufficient	  extent	  of	  the	  underlying	  molecular	  or	  
microphysical	  reality.	  	  At	  this	  point	  I	  am	  inclined	  to	  say	  that	  as	  we	  move	  to	  
something	  approaching	  a	  thesis	  of	  supervenience	  on	  the	  microphysical	  state	  
of	  the	  entire	  universe,	  we	  move	  towards	  a	  vacuity	  that	  verges	  on	  the	  
meaningless.	  	  Certainly	  such	  global	  supervenience	  is	  not	  an	  idea	  with	  
empirical	  implications.	  But	  for	  present	  purposes	  it	  is	  sufficient	  to	  conclude	  
that	  actual	  biological	  models	  will	  always	  and	  inescapably	  be	  partial,	  and	  their	  
applicability	  will	  be	  sensitive	  to	  features	  of	  their	  context.	  
	  
As	  noted	  earlier,	  another	  perspective	  on	  the	  protean	  character	  of	  biological	  
entities	  can	  be	  gained	  by	  suggesting	  that	  they	  are	  generally	  better	  understood	  
as	  processes	  than	  as	  things.	  	  A	  cell,	  for	  example,	  is	  a	  process	  that	  originates	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with	  the	  bifurcation	  of	  a	  mother	  cell,	  and	  ends	  in	  bifurcation	  or	  apoptosis.	  	  
During	  the	  period	  of	  its	  existence	  it	  will	  adopt	  various	  structural	  
configurations	  and	  contribute	  to	  various	  functions.	  	  Its	  existence	  is	  
determined	  not	  by	  some	  property	  or	  properties	  that	  it	  exhibits	  as	  long	  as	  it	  
exists,	  as	  we	  normally	  suppose	  for	  a	  substantial	  thing,	  but	  rather	  by	  a	  variety	  
of	  processes	  that	  sustain	  its	  integrity.	  	  In	  fact,	  everything	  in	  biology	  is	  dynamic,	  
and	  an	  appropriate	  metaphysics	  sees	  the	  living	  world	  as	  composed	  not	  of	  
things,	  but	  of	  processes	  (Dupré	  2012,	  chs.	  4-­‐5).	  	  Rather	  than	  see	  processes	  as	  
involving	  things	  undergoing	  changes,	  it	  is	  better,	  at	  least	  in	  biology,	  to	  
understand	  things	  as	  processes	  stabilised	  to	  some	  degree	  over	  relevant	  time	  
scales.	  	  The	  ‘things’	  in	  terms	  of	  which	  we	  often	  describe	  processes	  are	  
processes	  stabilised	  on	  time	  scales	  relevant	  to	  the	  process	  we	  are	  considering	  
(Bapteste	  and	  Dupré	  2012).	  	  Given	  the	  current	  state	  of	  physics	  it	  is	  plausible	  to	  
see	  the	  world	  as	  composed	  of	  processes	  ‘all	  the	  way	  down’;	  but	  this	  is	  an	  issue	  
that	  can	  be	  left	  moot	  for	  present	  purposes.	  
	  
To	  different	  degrees,	  all	  models	  abstract	  from	  the	  four-­‐dimensional	  character	  
of	  biological	  processes.	  	  Many	  or	  most	  biological	  models	  are	  of	  course	  
dynamic	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  they	  represent	  the	  way	  a	  system	  develops	  over	  
time,	  perhaps	  depending	  on	  some	  external	  variables.	  	  But	  this	  is	  already	  too	  
linear	  an	  approach	  to	  capture	  the	  full	  dynamic	  complexity	  of	  the	  system.	  As	  
J.S.	  Haldane	  (1931,	  p.	  22;	  cited	  in	  Nicholson	  and	  Gawne	  2013)	  put	  the	  point:	  
"Structure	  and	  functional	  relation	  to	  environment	  cannot	  be	  separated	  in	  the	  
serious	  scientific	  study	  of	  life,	  since	  structure	  expresses	  the	  maintenance	  of	  
function,	  and	  function	  expresses	  the	  maintenance	  of	  structure."	  I	  do	  not	  want	  
to	  argue	  that	  it	  is	  impossible	  to	  provide	  a	  representation	  of	  all	  this	  dynamic	  
complexity,	  but	  only	  to	  insist	  that	  there	  is	  very	  likely	  no	  reason	  to	  do	  so.	  	  Once	  
again,	  we	  need	  only	  recall	  the	  specific	  purposes	  for	  which	  we	  represent	  parts	  
or	  features	  of	  living	  systems,	  and	  the	  uselessness	  of	  the	  ‘perfect’	  Borgesian	  
map.	  	  	  
	  
Realism	  and	  Truth	  
My	  general	  point	  so	  far	  has	  been	  that	  biological	  models	  are	  partial,	  but	  
nonetheless	  the	  entities	  that	  they	  refer	  to	  are,	  often	  enough,	  real.	  	  This	  does	  
leave	  an	  awkward	  question,	  however,	  whether	  the	  things	  they	  assert	  are	  true.	  	  
If	  I	  present	  a	  model	  involving	  perfectly	  spherical	  cells,	  it	  may	  be	  acceptable	  to	  
say	  that	  I	  am	  referring	  to	  the	  actual,	  not	  quite	  spherical,	  entities	  in	  the	  world.	  	  
But	  surely	  if	  I	  say	  they	  are	  spherical,	  I	  say	  something	  false.	  	  Generally,	  it	  is	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impossible	  to	  avoid	  the	  conclusion	  that	  if	  a	  model	  is	  intended	  to	  assert	  the	  
existence	  of	  the	  states	  of	  affairs	  it	  portrays,	  then	  it	  will	  almost	  fail	  in	  this	  
intention.	  	  
	  
Considerations	  of	  this	  sort	  have	  led	  many	  philosophers	  to	  deny	  that	  
statements	  based	  on	  scientific	  models	  are	  generally	  true.	  	  Several	  responses	  
to	  this	  problem	  are	  possible.	  One	  would	  be	  to	  collapse	  Weisberg’s	  (2007)	  
distinction	  between	  models	  and	  abstract	  direct	  representation	  towards	  the	  
former,	  and	  claim	  that	  in	  both	  cases	  we	  are	  dealing	  with	  some	  kind	  of	  
cognitive	  instrument	  that	  illuminates	  the	  world	  by	  analogy	  rather	  than	  by	  
direct	  description	  (Knuuttila	  2005).	  	  Some	  go	  further	  and	  argue	  that	  scientific	  
models	  are	  best	  seen	  as	  a	  kind	  of	  fiction	  and	  can	  be	  illuminated	  by	  exploiting	  
ideas	  about	  literary	  fiction	  (e.g.	  Frigg	  2010;	  for	  a	  general	  discussion	  of	  this	  
strategy	  see	  Godfrey-­‐Smith	  2009);	  but	  this	  strategy,	  while	  it	  may	  be	  defensible	  
for	  certain	  classes	  of	  models,	  is	  surely	  inappropriate	  for	  the	  kinds	  of	  partial	  
representation	  I	  have	  been	  considering.	  	  My	  own	  preference	  is	  for	  a	  pragmatic	  
approach	  that	  takes	  scientific	  statements	  as	  true,	  or	  perhaps	  just	  correctly	  
assertible,	  if	  they	  correspond	  with	  the	  world	  in	  the	  intended	  respects.	  	  To	  
illustrate	  with	  a	  very	  simple	  example	  it	  is	  true,	  in	  appropriate	  contexts	  that	  
glucose	  is	  C6H12O6,	  and	  also	  that	  fructose	  is	  C6H12O6.	  No	  chemist	  would	  be	  
tempted	  to	  conclude	  that	  glucose	  was	  identical	  to	  fructose,	  though	  there	  
might	  be	  contexts	  in	  which	  the	  differences	  between	  these	  sugars	  was	  
irrelevant.	  	  Partial	  representations	  license	  assertions,	  but	  only	  in	  a	  suitably	  
limited	  class	  of	  contexts.	  The	  extent	  to	  which	  scientific	  descriptions	  are	  
adequate	  to	  their	  intended	  uses	  is	  always	  a	  matter	  open	  to	  further	  
investigation.	  	  A	  telling	  and	  tragic	  example	  is	  provided	  by	  the	  chemical	  
thalidomide,	  which	  normally	  exists	  as	  an	  equal	  mixture	  of	  two	  optical	  isomers,	  
mirror	  image	  structures,	  an	  apparently	  very	  subtle	  difference.	  	  One	  of	  these	  
isomers	  is	  an	  effective	  treatment	  for	  morning	  sickness;	  the	  other	  causes	  
drastic	  developmental	  abnormalities.	  	  For	  most	  purposes	  the	  three-­‐
dimensional	  structure,	  not	  specifying	  either	  of	  the	  optical	  isomers,	  would	  be	  a	  
fully	  adequate	  chemical	  description;	  for	  pharmacological	  purposes	  it	  was	  
clearly	  catastrophically	  insufficient.	  	  Whatever	  view	  is	  taken	  on	  truth,	  the	  
crucial	  point	  is	  that	  the	  limitations,	  known	  or	  unknown,	  of	  particular	  scientific	  




A	  wider	  context	  in	  which	  discussions	  of	  realism	  figure	  significantly	  is	  the	  
general	  philosophical	  thesis	  of	  naturalism.	  	  Unfortunately	  naturalism	  is	  a	  
highly	  contested	  concept.	  My	  own	  view	  is	  that	  a	  more	  useful	  thesis	  is	  anti-­‐
supernaturalism	  (Dupré	  2012,	  Ch.	  1).	  	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  naturalism	  is	  the	  view	  
that	  a	  proper	  ontology	  should	  be	  restricted	  to	  entities	  that	  have	  some	  
empirically	  accessible	  connection	  to	  the	  natural	  order;	  it	  is	  a	  negative	  thesis	  
rather	  than	  a	  positive	  one.	  	  The	  objective	  should	  be	  to	  leave	  the	  
characterisation	  of	  the	  natural	  order	  as	  vague	  as	  possible,	  while	  allowing	  
enough	  substance	  to	  exclude	  such	  entities	  as	  deities	  or	  immaterial	  souls.	  	  Of	  
course	  it	  is	  not	  an	  a	  priori	  truth	  that	  there	  are	  no	  deities	  or	  souls.	  	  If	  Jupiter	  
were	  to	  appear	  in	  public	  view	  and	  begin	  casting	  thunderbolts	  and	  mating	  with	  
swans,	  our	  evaluation	  might	  rapidly	  change.	  	  Theology	  might	  become	  a	  
respectable	  branch	  of	  empirical	  science.	  	  But	  while	  Gods	  continue	  to	  play	  no	  
detectable	  role	  in	  public	  life,	  a	  naturalist	  will	  exclude	  them	  from	  his	  or	  her	  
ontology.	  	  The	  point	  of	  the	  vagueness	  is	  to	  prevent	  substantive	  positive	  theses	  
about	  the	  world	  to	  be	  smuggled	  in	  under	  cover	  of	  this	  purely	  negative	  thesis.	  	  	  
	  
Materialism,	  for	  example,	  is	  sometimes	  taken	  to	  imply	  no	  more	  than	  the	  
exclusion	  of	  the	  immaterial,	  where	  this	  has	  very	  much	  the	  same	  import	  as	  the	  
supernatural.	  	  But	  there	  is	  also	  a	  tendency	  to	  equate	  naturalism	  with	  
materialism	  and	  thence	  often	  to	  reductive	  physicalism.	  	  Concepts	  such	  as	  
emergence	  or	  so-­‐called	  downward	  causation,	  the	  determination	  of	  the	  
behaviour	  of	  parts	  by	  wholes	  of	  which	  they	  are	  parts,	  are	  said	  to	  be	  ‘spooky’,	  
indicative	  of	  the	  supernatural.	  	  On	  the	  contrary,	  these	  seem	  to	  me	  clearly	  
contingent	  and	  empirical	  hypotheses	  about	  how	  the	  natural	  world	  works.	  
The	  motivation	  for	  naturalism	  is	  often,	  and	  appropriately,	  the	  view	  that	  the	  
broadly	  empirical	  methods	  we	  think	  of	  as	  scientific	  have	  provided	  an	  
epistemology	  for	  exploring	  the	  world	  vastly	  more	  successful	  than	  the	  appeal	  
to	  supernatural	  agents	  lying	  outside	  the	  natural	  order.	  	  Our	  ontology,	  it	  is	  then	  
argued,	  should	  be	  based	  on	  successful	  epistemology.	  	  This	  motivation	  makes	  
clear	  why	  some	  kind	  of	  realism	  is	  necessary	  for	  such	  a	  motivation	  of	  
naturalism.	  	  Without	  a	  realistic	  interpretation	  of	  science	  no	  link	  can	  be	  made	  
from	  successful	  science-­‐based	  epistemology	  to	  ontology.	  	  As	  I	  hope	  to	  have	  
shown,	  while	  it	  is	  not	  trivial	  to	  provide	  a	  realistic	  account	  of	  biological	  
methodology,	  there	  are	  no	  insuperable	  obstacles	  to	  doing	  so,	  and	  indeed	  the	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